The Federal Communications Commission rule making for low-power FM radio was widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked a regulatory agency for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Because rival policy optima are quantifiable in this case, the preferences of Congress and the Commission can be directly evaluated. While policy differences between Congress and the regulatory agency were visible to interest groups, they signified a negligible increment when compared to the efficient policy solution. A financial event study supports this interpretation, as radio broadcasters' equity values were not materially affected by the competitive entry envisioned by the Commission. This suggests that reportedly sharp differences between Congressional and agency political preferences can be trivial in economic terms, as predicted by the Congressional Dominance view of regulation.
I. Introduction
a. The Delegation Question.
Congress delegates administrative control to regulatory agencies with broad "public interest" mandates. When agents appear to set rules at odds with congressional preferences, however, the question arises: Who controls regulation?
The view that "runaway bureaucrats" pursue their own agendas in defiance of Congress (Dodd and Schott, 1979; Wilson, 1980) was answered by Weingast and Moran (1983) , who showed that enforcement actions of the Federal Trade Commission were highly correlated with the political views of Congress, particularly oversight committee chairs. This evidence, and the fact that Congress directly legislates to overturn certain agency initiatives, suggests that Congress controls regulation.
The basic logic of the Congressional Dominance perspective developed by Weingast and Moran (1983) is shown in Figure 1 . Regulatory agency actions are characterized in simple, monotonic terms -e.g., the level of antitrust enforcement -on the horizontal axis. Preferences for various enforcement levels generate levels of utility for Congress, given by U(C), and the agency, given by U(A). The optimal levels for Congress and the agency are C* and A*, respectively. Administrative procedures incorporated in the regulatory process are designed to reduce congressional monitoring costs and facilitate early discipline of agents (McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987; McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1989; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) , constraining divergence between the rival optima. The procedure for agency appointees, a joint power of the executive and the legislative is also designed to minimize principal-agent conflict (Calvert, McCubbins, Weingast, 1989) . 1 But Congress and agency preferences are not static, and monitoring is imperfect; hence, differences appear. When the "gap" is of sufficient size, Congress is motivated to intervene, moving the level of enforcement, A*, towards C*.
The transaction costs literature provides a general explanation for the process (Epstein and O'Hallorin, 1999) . Agency costs -the costs to Congress of delegating decision-making to an independent regulatory commission -are offset by two factors:
1) The expertise of agency officials allows Congress to regulate more widely, and strategically, than otherwise. Agents are employed, despite possible conflicts of interest, due to the net gains associated with specialization.
2) When conflicts become substantial, Congress may impose remedies at relatively low cost. Indeed, hearings, legislation, or other corrective actions can be undertaken to the ongoing benefit of committee chairs and their allies who garner support by reigning in "runaway bureaucrats."
Under this set of constraints, how far do regulators stray? Weingast and Moran (1983) show that, in the 1964-1976 period, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was responsive to the changing political demands of congressional members (particularly Senate oversight members). They also note that, pursuant to legislation limiting FTC activities in 1979, agency behavior was brought into conformity with congressional preferences. Using data from seven government agencies, Wood and Waterman (1991) 1 "There is available to the principal [Congress] , however, a large repertoire of mechanisms for reducing agency losses -screening and selection procedures, contract design (including both compensation schedules and sanctions for malfeasance), monitoring and reporting requirements, and institutional checks. These mechanisms are themselves costly to invoke, but the principal can choose the mix of mechanisms that is most effective and least costly" (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991:38). found evidence that agency appointees are an effective mechanism for political control.
Yet, neither set of observations calibrates the distance between congressional demands and agency actions (i.e., the magnitude of A*-C*). A positive correlation between political changes in Congress and changes in FTC regulatory actions suggests that
Congress pulls regulation in its direction (A* approaches C*), and statutory constraints demonstrate that discrete policy interventions may be used to eliminate the gap altogether.
It remains an open question as to how much leeway independent agencies enjoy.
One recent regulatory episode -the low-power FM radio rule making at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) -provides a rare opportunity to calibrate this distance. Formally initiated in January 1999, the low-power FM rule making at the FCC culminated in an order creating a new class of low-power stations, to be licensed to non-profit community organizations. Our analysis abstracts from assessing the influence that preferences of the committee members, the legislators, and the president have on the final statutory outcome. 2 We rather focus on showing that this difference may not be as significant as it is implied in the literature. Congress reacted by enacting legislation in (Wildman, 2001). 4 This gave rise to the consensus view that Congressional action 3
Our study does not attempt to deconstruct policy preferences within Congress, nor between Congress and the Executive, which would constitute a useful, parallel investigation. See Steunenberg (1992) . 4 Specifically, it required LPFM stations to provide 3 rd adjacent channel protection to existing primary service (full power) FM stations 106 th Congress, Appendix B § 632(Dec. 21, 2000) ).
"sharply curtails the ambitious plans of the Federal Communications Commission to issue licenses for low-power FM radio stations."
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This high profile battle between Congress and the FCC yields testable implications for the Congressional Dominance view of regulation. In this paper we identify and measure three rival regulatory optima:
• The FCC's, calibrated by its proposal to license about 2,300 low-power FM stations;
• Congress', which limited licenses to about 1,300 low-power FM stations;
• Consumer welfare maximization, achieved by fully utilizing the FM band to accommodate non-interfering broadcasters. As conservatively estimated below, this would allow for nearly 100,000 low-power FM stations.
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While the FCC's allotment of low-power radio licenses differed from that preferred by Congress, both allocations were trivial relative to the level of entry possible. 7 When combined with other rules imposed on prospective low-power FM station applicants, the distance between Congress and the FCC was inconsequential as a fraction of total FM band capacity. This modest difference, however, was large enough for Congress and the FCC to engage in significant "credit-claming" and "blame-shifting" (Meyhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1982; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) , generating gains for 5 Labaton, Stephen. 2000. "Congress Severely Curtails Plan For Low-power Radio Stations." New York Times December 19, A1. "Even as the Federal Communications Commission charges ahead with its fasttrack licensing drive, powerful forces in Washington, DC are pushing hard to halt this train before it leaves the station. The National Association of Broadcasters and National Public Radio have led the lobbying in favor of separate attempts in the House and Senate to limit low-power stations" (Fisher, Mark. 2000 . "Lobbying Against Low-power Radio," American Journalism Review 46). 6 This estimate abstracts from possible entry into radio broadcasting due to liberalization elsewhere; e.g., in the AM radio, or UHF TV bands. 7 The overly conservative nature of FCC spectrum allocation policy has long been noted. A detailed treatment is given in Hazlett (2001) . incumbent legislators. Hence, the evidence yielded in the low-power FM regulatory episode tends both to support the Congressional Dominance view and to offer texture to the process whereby relative small policy differences stimulate substantial rent-seeking.
II. FM Radio Regulation by the FCC
The FM band is divided into 100 channels, with 200 KHz allocated to each. FCC rules control interference between stations by imposing power and antenna height limits, and geographical and frequency separation. If stations transmit within three channels the FCC imposes minimum distance requirements (CFR, 47 §73.201, subpart B and §73.207, October 1, 1999) .
The simple trade-offs are depicted in Figure 2 October 1, 1999) . Finally, another type of distance requirement is to avoid "blanketing interference", which affects all stations geographically located (regardless of frequency) within a radius (R) estimated by: R = 0.245 (P) 1/2 ; where R is measured in miles, and P is the maximum effective radiated power (ERP) in kilowatts (47 CFR 73.318, October 1, 1999 that one channel be allocated in both the AM and FM bands to provide a new one-watt micro-radio service (Leggett et al., 1997) . On February 20, 1998, another petition (RM-9242) was filed by J. Rodger Skinner, who proposed the creation of three classes of lowpower service in the FM band: 1) A primary service with an effective radiated power between 50 and 3,000 watts; 2) a secondary service with an effective radiated power below 50 watts; and 3) a special event service with an effective radiated power under 20
watts, authorizations not to exceed 10 days. The primary service would be required to comply with the existing criteria for co-channel and first adjacent channel separation (Skinner, 1998) .
The FCC requested public comment on the petitions, 10 triggering a formal rule making process. Rulings were issued in January 1999, January 2000, and September 2000 11 (FCC, 1999; 2000a; 2000b) , as outlined in Appendix 1. Restrictions increased from start to finish. Congressional activity likely influenced this outcome, as hearings, legislation, and statements by key committee members (overwhelmingly critical of the FCC for being too liberal, or pro-entry) were frequently reported in the trade press. 12 A summary of the main events in Congress is given in Appendix 2.
In the conventional wisdom, the FCC promoted a liberal allocation of low-power Congress stepped in to constrain the regulatory agency, such a substantial schism would expose a potentially substantial principal-agent problem. Fortuitously, the theory yields testable implications. Before turning to these tests, however, we examine one additional policy detail: the outcome of a low-power FM rule maximizing consumer surplus.
IV. An Estimate of FM Band Low-Power Station Insert Capacity
What is the optimal number of low-power FM radio stations? A simple model can estimate the capacity of the FM band to a first approximation. This model does not predict economic viability; a market test would be necessary to establish how many lowpower FM stations listeners, advertisers, or contributors would support. But it does answer a relevant policy question. In the absence of arguments to the contrary, open entry permits a competitive equilibrium to obtain.
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Hence, we calibrate a benchmark policy optimum.
We assume that the FM band is fixed, and that one hundred 20-kHz channels are allocated to each FM radio market -i.e., the status quo. 14 We further assume that within each of 269 local markets 15 existing stations continue to enjoy exclusive use of assigned frequencies and (as buffers) the channels bordering either side. 16 New 100-watt lowpower FM stations are given co-channel protection such that no station transmits within the coverage area of another low-power FM station.
Our separation standard follows Rappaport et al. (1999) , 17 which notes that the 3-channel separation rule was established when older technology made FM radios more susceptible to interfering emissions than modern receivers (Rappaport et al., 1999:3, 6) .
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"The FCC protection ratios were designed to provide simple and conservative spacings to prevent early FM radio receivers from undesired retuning to strong adjacent stations."
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The conservative assumptions in the FCC propagation models insure that radio stations are more widely spaced than necessary.
20
Indeed, the FCC has tested the one channel FM separation rule used here and found it sufficient to limit interference between full-power stations. In a 1997 FCC 15 According to Arbitron Radio Market Ranking (Fall 1999) there are 276 metropolitan radio markets in the United States, but seven of these are embedded in larger markets. We combine duplicates to avoid double counting. See: www.arbitron.com/radiosurvey/mm001025.htm. These markets do not exhaustively cover U.S. households; only about one-half of U.S. stations broadcast in designated radio markets. (BIA Financial, The 1999 State of the Industry Radio Report, Executive Summary, 2; www.biacompanies.com/state_radio.htm.) This also implies substantial under-estimation of low-power FM insert capacity in our model. 16 In other words, each licensee is granted exclusive use of three channels within the local market area. This is a stronger restriction than imposing minimum distance requirements. The rationale for this separation rule is given below. Rappaport et al. (1999:41) . 19 Rappaport et al (1999: 43) . 20 Formally, the FCC seeks to guarantee a minimum signal-to-noise ratio at the edge of the signal contour. These ratios are then used to calculate the required distance separation between stations to avoid interference. Yet, the ratios used by the FCC do not relate to actual signal-to-noise ratios in the field, which are much higher, and thus yield much better audio quality (Rappaport et al., 1999:43-45, 47 23 According to the FCC a 100-watt station with and antenna height of 98 feet (30m) would produce a 1mv/m (60dBu) signal contour at a distance of 3.5 miles (FCC, 1999: par. 30 having a radius of 2.5 miles for the most powerful (Class C) FM stations, or 18.9 square miles (Rappaport et al., 1999:21-2) . To be conservative, we increase the blanketing area to the same value assumed for the contour area of a 100-watt low-power FM station, or 64 square miles. Adjusting our equation to account for blanketing interference, and summing over 269 radio markets, yields the following equation:
where X i is the number of existing FM stations in market i and Y is the number of licenses for low-power FM service that can be accommodated on the FM dial. As seen in Table   2 , this estimation yields an insert FM band capacity of 306,805 low-power stations. Even when we cap the density of low-power FM stations per market at one per 1,000 population, 24 the band maintains an insertion capacity of 97,701 new 100-watt stations.
This estimate is very likely a lower bound due to the conservative assumptions applied.
25
Moreover, it covers only the 269 metropolitan markets monitored by Arbitron, and these account for just about one-half of existing FM radio stations.
V. Three Policy Optima
We may now compare the revealed policy preferences of Congress (C*) and the ;" 'The FCC has moved without any consideration of the facts,' said Representative John Dingell, Democrat of Michigan. 'This is a reasonable common sense compromise. It will protect the broadcasters, it will protect the licensees, and above all else, it will protect listeners of the FM radio spectrum.' " Stephen Labaton, House Clears Bill to Curb Plans for FM, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 14, 2000:C1). 27 "We will require that for the first two years of LPFM service, any one entity may own only one LPFM station (…). After the first two years, to bring into use whatever low power stations remain available but unapplied for, we will allow one entity to own up to five stations nationally, and after the first three years of service, we will allow an entity to own up to ten stations nationwide" (FCC, 2000a:par. 39). 28 "We will prohibit common ownership of LPFM and any other broadcast station, including translators, and low power television stations, as well as other media subject to our ownership rules (…). This prohibition is national and absolute in nature, unlike our existing cross-media ownership rules. By themselves, FCC rules ensured that low-power stations would prove expensive to operate and difficult to fund. With congressional pressure, regulatory constraints on entrants intensified. Congress and the agency appeared to reach consensus on these regulatory aspects of low-power FM policy.
VI. Low-power FM Policy: A Market Test
The An event study can be used to determine if financial markets anticipated that either FCC rulings or Congressional actions would impact the profitability of existing radio broadcasters. The premise of event studies is that capital markets reveal how new information is anticipated to affect future returns (Fama 1976: 66-70) , and is useful in policy analysis because, "If there are specialized resources linked to regulation, such as taxicab medallions or stock exchange seats, the value of these assets can be used to measure some of the effects of regulation" (Schwert 1981: 121) .
If investors expect serious consequences for the regulation-specific asset held by radio stations, broadcasting licenses, 31 then we expect to observe negative returns for radio station owners during windows in which the FCC takes pro-entry actions, and positive share returns with news of congressional intervention to limit entry.
We perform an event study for the period Feb. 2, 1998 -Mar. 8, 2001 , examining daily returns to shareholders in relatively "pure" owners of radio stations (full-power AM and FM incumbents). We extend the standard "market model" to include dummy variables to estimate excess 3-day event window returns (Binder, 1985) , and use panel data estimation with fixed effects to control for unobserved firm specific characteristics. where r it = 3-day [t-1 to t+1] percentage change of firm "i" stock return (price change plus dividends) measured at day "t"; β 0i = is the fixed-effect of firm "i", taken as constant over time; M t = 3-day percent change of market index at day "t"; FCC t = dummy variable with a value of one if on day "t" occurred a FCC ruling on low-power FM, zero otherwise; CONG t = dummy variable with a value of one if on day "t" occurred an event in Congress related to the low-power FM initiative, zero otherwise; e it = residual term of firm "i" returns at time "t." Using our base model we test the hypothesis that a substantial principal-agent problem exists. This implies jointly that: β 2 < 0, β 3 > 0.
Data. Our sample of six publicly listed radio station owners is listed in Table 3 . 33 Eleven events in Congress signified potentially substantial developments on the low-power FM initiative. See Table 4 . Five FCC developments signaled potential Table 3 PROFILE OF RADIO BROADCAST FIRMS Firm Profile Cox Radio Inc.
National radio broadcasting co. owns, operates, and develops radio stations in the U.S. As of December 1999, Cox Radio owned and/or operated 83 radio stations in 17 markets. Approximately 73% of net revenues are generated from local radio advertising.
Entercom Communications
Fourth largest radio broadcasting company in the U.S. based on revenues. As of December 1999, the company had 96 radio stations (60 FM and 36 AM) in 17 markets.
Radio One Radio broadcasting firm primarily targeting African-Americans. The company has approximately 40 radio stations.
Citadel Communications
Owns approximately 136 FM stations and 61 AM stations in 42 midsized markets. Virtually all of the company's revenues are generated from the sales of local, regional and national advertising on its radio stations.
Cumulus Media Inc.
The third largest radio broadcasting company in the U.S. based on number of stations. Upon conclusion of pending acquisitions, the firm will own 324 radio stations (228 FM and 96 AM) . Virtually all of the firm's revenues are generated from the sale of local, regional and national advertising time on its radio stations.
Hispanic Broadcasting
Spanish-language radio broadcasting company that owns 45 radio stations in 13 U.S. markets. In addition the company operates the HBC Radio Network, a Spanish-language radio broadcast network serving the U.S. market.
Source: http://biz.yahoo.com/research/indgrp/brdcst_radio_tv.html (visited Feb. 6, 2001 ). Nasdaq = Nasdaq Composite Index; CXR = Cox Radio Inc; ETM = Entercom Communications; ROIA = Radio One Inc; CITC = Citadel Communications; CMLS = Cumulus Media Inc; HSP = Hispanic Broadcasting; n.a. = Not available. a Median excess return (%)= Equally-weighted median price change of 6 firms(%) -Market index change(%). We used the Nasdaq index as the market index. b Mean excess return (%) = Equally-weighted mean price change of 6 firms(%) -Market index change(%). We used the Nasdaq index as the market index. Cumulative -1.87 -4.96 Nasdaq = Nasdaq Composite Index; CXR = Cox Radio Inc; ETM = Entercom Communications; ROIA = Radio One Inc; CITC = Citadel Communications; CMLS = Cumulus Media Inc; HSP = Hispanic Broadcasting; n.a. = Not available. a Median excess return (%)= Equally-weighted median price change of 6 firms(%) -Market index change(%). We used the Nasdaq index as the market index. b Mean excess return (%) = Equally-weighted mean price change of 6 firms(%) -Market index change(%). We used the Nasdaq index as the market index.
changes in low-power FM rules. See Table 5 .
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Regression analysis of policy events. The base model (equation 1) is estimated along with two alternative specifications. The first separates Congressional actions into those that appear to favor incumbents, and those that favor entrants (the McCain bills). The second tests for the possibility that the first three FCC actions were pro-entry, while the last two became hostile after disciplined was exerted by Congress.
Thus, we estimate three specifications. In each regression we compute efficient standard errors using the Newey-West robust covariance matrix.
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Results are shown in Table 6 . Across all specifications, station owner returns are highly correlated with the NASDAQ market index. In Specification 1 (the base model), incumbent returns lack statistical significance during low-power FM regulatory in Congress and the FCC. Moreover, both estimated dummy coefficients are identically signed (i.e., both are negative). Similar results are obtained using the bootstrap technique. Separating the McCain bills from others in Congress does not alter results 34 We eliminated those observations of events falling within the 3-day period of a stock down or upgrade listed under "Analyst History" on Yahoo!Finance. We extended this criteria to two days before the event [t-2] as the effect of the down or upgrade may extend past one day, or be made after hours. This rule led to the elimination of one observation (Sept. ). We did not find news reports on Yahoo!Finance of any merger or takeover activity involving our firms during event windows. 35 We tested for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and non-normality in the distribution of error terms. The Durbin-Watson test provided evidence of first order autocorrelation while the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test indicated heteroskedasticity in error terms. Finally the Chi-square goodness of fit test indicated non normality in the error terms (White, 1997:18-20) . These results violate the usual assumptions used in ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. Therefore OLS estimates, although unbiased and consistent, would be inefficient. To correct for inefficient standard errors we used the Newey-West robust covariance matrix that allows for within group (firms in our case) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (Newey and West, 1987; Greene, 1997:504-6 ). The results appear in Table 6 in specifications 1 to 3. For comparative purposes we also include results using the bootstrap method (specifications 4 to 6), which provide efficient estimators when error terms are not normally distributed (Freedman and Peters, 1984; Efron, 1982:35-6; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997:362-8) . Panel data estimation with firm specific fixed-effects and Newey-West standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. *=99% confidence level; n.a. = not applicable. F-test that all event coefficients equal to zero cannot be rejected with 99% confidence.
(specification 2), coefficients lack significance and both Congressional dummies are of the wrong sign. Specification 3 tests the hypothesis that initial FCC events threatened broadcasters while subsequent FCC events signified an alignment with Congress. The results do not support this hypothesis; again estimated coefficients are insignificant and both FCC dummies are signed the wrong way. The hypothesis that all event coefficients are zero cannot be rejected with 99 percent confidence.
Regression analysis of news stories. Finally, we performed an alternative event study, testing whether news stories about low-power FM regulation in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times were associated with abnormal broadcaster returns.
There were two news categories: "FCC goes ahead" (presumably negative news for existing FM radio stations); and "Congress prevails" (positive for existing FM stations).
We identified eight "FCC goes ahead" articles and eight "Congress prevails." 36 See Table 7 . We regressed broadcast radio equity returns against the NASDAQ index and dummies for "FCC goes ahead" news and "Congress prevails" news using a modified version of Equation (1). 37 The results show insignificant negative returns across all news events. See Table 8 .
We interpret these results as evidence tending to reject the hypothesis that a substantial policy difference was evident between Congress and the regulatory agency.
As the FCC's plan did not threaten equity values, Congress did not visibly bolster them. 36 As before, we eliminate observations of news appearing between the window period of [t-2 to t+1] of a stock down or upgrade listed in "Analyst History" in Yahoo!Finance web site. 37 In other words, we re-estimated Equation (1) using NYT and WSJ news events in place of actual regulatory or legislative events. The dummy variable "FCC goes ahead" takes the value of one if on day "t" such news appeared; else, the dummy has a value of zero. The dummy variable "Congress prevails" is defined in similar way. and "blame-shifting," while the underlying regulatory equilibrium was never seriously challenged. In quantifying the distance between the FCC and Congress, and comparing both positions to the pro-consumer optimum, we show that marginal differences (in economic terms) are enough to prompt statute policy making. 40 Such flamboyant scuffling over essentially fixed policies has long been a noted feature of FCC broadcast regulation. In words of Prof. Coase (1966: 442) "the regulation of the broadcasting industry by the Federal Communications Commission resembles a professional wrestling match. The grunts and groans resound through the land, but no permanent injury seems to result." See also Coase (1965 Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) introduced an identical bill, S-2068, in the Senate.
• . 42 The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the leading trade group for incumbent FM stations responded furiously: "The McCain/Kerry Low-power Radio Act introduced yesterday should be renamed the 'Interference Assurance Act'……..Even though the FCC acknowledges there will be interference on the FM band, both lawmakers prefer that the FCC deal with it after the fact, rather than trying to solve the problem before…" NAB, Statement by NAB President/CEO Eddie Fritts, RE: McCain/Kerry Low-power FM Bill (July 28, 2000) . www.nab.org/newsroom/pressrel/STATEMENTS/S1500.HTM, visited February 28, 2001.
• September 7, 2000. Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) introduced S-3020, identical to HR-3439.
• October 25, 2000. Rep. Harold Rogers (R-KY) introduced HR-5548, an appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and related agencies. Section 632 of the bill follows HR-3439. The bill was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.
• 
